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The Law Society’s
Response to the Draft
Mental Health Bill1
The Law Society has long campaigned for reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 (‘the 1983 Act’),
which is widely recognised as out of date and not fully compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998.2
However the Law Society believes that the proposals contained in the Draft Mental Health Bill
2004 (‘the Bill’) are misconceived and fail to provide adequate safeguards to protect the rights of
people with a mental disorder. 
The relevant conditions for compulsion
Like many other organisations, the Law Society believes that the Bill’s criteria for compulsory care
and treatment are too broad. This is illustrated by the example of a smoker, who has tried and
failed to give up, and would fulfil all the relevant conditions in clause 9:
1. The patient must be suffering from a mental disorder. Nicotine dependency is included in the
ICD-10 classification of mental disorders (F17) and is listed in the DSM-IV classification
(code 305.20)
2. The mental disorder must be of such a nature or degree as to warrant the provision of medical
treatment. There is no requirement that the person’s mental disorder has to justify
compulsory in-patient treatment. In this case the addiction warrants treatment (nicotine
patches, counseling, etc).
3. It must be necessary for the protection of the patient from suicide or serious self harm or serious
neglect of his health or safety. Smoking causes serious neglect of the patient’s health.
4. Medical treatment cannot be lawfully provided without the patient being subject to compulsion.
This condition is met because the patient continues to smoke despite being advised of
the harm being caused to him/herself. 
5. Medical treatment must be available which is appropriate to the patient’s case. Treatment is
available for nicotine dependency. 
1 The Law Society gave oral evidence to the Joint
Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee on 3rd November
2004 (ref: HC 127-vi). Its written evidence can be
found at www.lawsociety.org.uk. Its response to the
Draft Mental Health Bill 2002 was published in the
JMHL December 2002 at pp 373 – 375. This article
was accepted for publication before (a) the Joint
Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee on the Draft Mental
Health Bill reported (23rd March 2005), and (b) the
Mental Capacity Bill received the Royal Assent (7th
April 2005).
2 R (MH) v Secretary of State for the Department of
Health [2004] EWCA Civ 1609 being the latest in a
series of declarations of incompatibility between the
ECHR and the 1983 Act. 
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The Government may claim that such situations are unlikely to arise because the good sense and
discretion of doctors can be relied upon. However the Bill gives clinicians no discretion about the
use of compulsory powers if the relevant conditions are satisfied.3 This is in contrast to the 1983
Act, where even if the relevant conditions are met the clinicians can use their discretion as to
whether or not to use compulsory powers. The Law Society believes that patients’ rights will only
be protected by tightly defined relevant conditions and by providing clinicians with discretion
about the use of compulsory powers.
Community Treatment Orders
The introduction of compulsory community treatment orders appears to be based on the
misconception that it is a lack of legal powers which places the public at risk from people suffering
from mental disorder. The various homicide inquiries overwhelmingly show that it is lack of
resources, lack of information and lack of communication that causes care and treatment to break
down in such a way as to increase the likelihood of a tragedy.4 Increased legal powers, such as
community treatment orders, will not improve this situation unless they are backed-up by
sufficient resources and if patients in the community are properly supported there would be less
need for compulsory powers. 
The Law Society is concerned that the Bill fails to ensure that only a limited and strictly defined
group of patients could be made subject to community treatment orders. The Bill refers to the use
of regulations to limit the group of patients who can be compulsorily assessed in the community
without an immediately preceding hospital admission5 but there is no equivalent provision for a
non-resident treatment order.6 The Bill is also silent on the matters that the Mental Health Tribunal
will have to take into account in deciding on residence or non-residence as part of the treatment
plan. This will mean that the use of compulsory community treatment is not restricted to a tightly
defined group of patients and therefore it could be imposed on patients with severe and non severe
mental health problems. 
The Bill authorises a compulsory community assessment to be carried out without an immediately
preceding hospital admission for “revolving door patients”.7 However the Law Society is
concerned that the Government has not clarified what it means by a “revolving door patient” and
specifically whether this will be based on previous compulsory admissions. If the definition of
revolving door patients includes voluntary admissions, this will make many people with mental
health problems reluctant to agree to short voluntary admissions, because they will be ‘collecting
points’ towards a disadvantageous status.8
The Law Society also believes that the proposals for community assessment and treatment are
impracticable. The experience of supervised discharge under s25A of the 1983 Act illustrates that
3 Clauses 16 and 38
4 See ‘McGrath and Oyebode (2002) Qualitative
Analysis of Recommendations in 79 Inquiries after
Homicide Committed by Persons with Mental Illness’,
Journal of Mental Health Law – December 2002,
pp262–282).
5 Clause 15 (2) and Explanatory Notes Para. 66
6 Similarly there is also nothing to restrict the
circumstances in which a patient who is liable to
assessment is made a non-resident patient by the
clinical supervisor for the duration of the assessment
period.
7 Clause 15 (2) and Explanatory Notes Para. 66
8 Para. 66 of the explanatory notes mentions patients
“who are known to services”, “prone to relapse” and
“get into a cycle of admission and discharge”; but does
not specifically mention previous compulsory
admissions
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where people in the community are ‘required’ to comply with certain conditions, this has proved
difficult to enforce.9 Under the Bill, a clinical supervisor is given the power to ‘take and convey’ a
non-resident patient back to hospital where he/she fails to comply with the conditions, however it
is not made clear how this is to be achieved.10 The use of a warrant under clause 225 may be
intended for this purpose but would be dependent on police and ambulance availability and
resources. Also, since the patient must be detained within 24 hours, it is likely that a hospital bed
must be kept free thus putting extra strain on limited resources.11
It is also of some concern that the legal thresholds for the provision of compulsory community
treatment are very wide indeed. Crucially the Bill breaks the link in the 1983 Act between the use
of compulsion and the requirement that it is necessary for the patient to receive treatment in
hospital. For example, the third condition specifies that medical treatment must be necessary for
the protection of other persons, which is a far lower threshold than the 1983 Act which requires
that detention in hospital must be necessary for the protection of others. In a risk-averse society
such as ours, it is quite easy to imagine that mere nuisance behaviour could be used to justify
making a person subject to compulsory powers in the community. This raises the alarming
possibility of using mental health legislation to create psychiatric Anti-Social Behaviour Orders
(ASBOs).
In addition, the Bill authorises non resident treatment orders to include a condition that ‘the
patient does not engage in specified conduct’.12 The meaning of ‘specified conduct’ is not defined
but potentially includes preventing a person going to the pub or associating with certain people.
This raises further fears that the Bill authorises psychiatric ASBOs. 
Mental Capacity
One of the Bill’s major failings is the lack of any reference to a patient’s mental capacity to make
treatment decisions in the relevant conditions for compulsion. There has been increasing judicial
recognition that the imposition of treatment on competent patients raises issues under Article 3
(prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and Article 8 (respect for private and family life)
of the ECHR, especially where the person does not present a danger to the health or safety of
others.13 This is likely to form the basis of future challenges to the Bill.
The lack of explicit reference to mental capacity means that the relevant conditions are
fundamentally flawed. For example, the requirement that treatment must protect the patient from
‘suicide or serious self-harm, or from serious neglect by him of his health or safety’14 is too narrow
for people who lack capacity and would prevent treatment being provided to an incapacitated
patient who resists treatment but presents a low level of risk.15 On the other hand, where a person
has capacity to make treatment decisions this condition is too wide. 
9 For example, the power to take and convey has been
found to be of ‘minimal importance and rarely used
(Bindman et al (2001) ‘National Evaluation of
Supervised Discharge and Guardianship’ Report of a
study commissioned by the DOH, p.75). 
10 Clause 48
11 Clause 48 (7)
12 Clauses 46 (7) and 119(7) 
13 See R (Wilkinson) v RMO Broadmoor Hospital [2001]
EWCA Civ 1545
14 Clause 9(4)
15 For example a person with a learning disability who
lacks mental capacity to make treatment decisions and
who is being treated by a psychiatrist for challenging
behaviour but also suffers from mild depression and
refuses treatment. Under the Bill they could not be
treated for depression. The Mental Capacity Bill would
also not permit forced treatment in these circumstances.
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The Bill also provides that a mentally disordered person thought to be at ‘substantial risk of
causing serious harm to other persons’ will not be allowed to receive treatment informally, if the
other relevant conditions in clause 9 apply.16 This will mean that people who have the capacity to
consent to treatment and who do consent will still be made subject to compulsory powers. The
Law Society believes that this fails the ECHR requirement that any restrictions on liberty must be
proportionate to the objective to be achieved. 
Interface with the Mental Capacity Bill
The Law Society is concerned that the relationship between the Draft Mental Health Bill and
Mental Capacity Bill will be complex and confusing. The Draft Mental Health Bill provides that an
individual cannot be subject to compulsory powers unless “medical treatment cannot lawfully be
provided to the patient without him being subject to the provisions of this Part”.17 This means that
if a person lacks capacity and can be treated under the Mental Capacity Bill, he/she cannot come
under the Draft Mental Health Bill. It is therefore likely that the Bill will mainly be used to impose
treatment on people who have capacity but refuse treatment. 
Under the Mental Capacity Bill a doctor can treat an incapacitated person in his/her best
interests.18 This includes using restraint, whether or not the incapacitated person resists, if this is
necessary to prevent harm and is proportionate to the likelihood of the incapacitated person
suffering harm and the seriousness of that harm. 
Under the Draft Mental Health Bill, the clinical supervisor must discharge a treatment order if at
any time he/she is not satisfied that all of the relevant conditions are met in the patient’s case.19
This means that if the patient loses capacity and can be treated under the Mental Capacity Bill,
he/she must be discharged from the Draft Mental Health Bill.20 Therefore the clinical supervisor
must keep the patient’s capacity under constant review and may be required to discharge the
patient as soon as he/she becomes aware that the patient has lost capacity to make treatment
decisions.
If the incapacitated person has an Attorney or a court appointed deputy who objects to treatment,
the Mental Capacity Bill cannot be used to authorise treatment and they would be subject to the
Draft Mental Health Bill if the other conditions under clause 9 are met. Furthermore, if the person
has made a valid advance decision under the Mental Capacity Bill refusing admission to psychiatric
hospital and/or the provision of psychiatric medication should they lose capacity in the future,
they could only be treated under the Draft Mental Health Bill, so long as all the relevant conditions
in clause 9 applied.
The Law Society believes that the relationship between the two Bills is so complex that, in many
cases, it would be practically impossible to work out when one Act should be used and the other
should not.
16 Clause 9 (7)
17 Clause 9 (5)
18 Clause 5, The Mental Capacity Bill 2004 
19 Clause 60
20 This is because in accordance with clause 9 (5) lawful
treatment can be provided under the Mental Capacity
Bill and therefore the relevant conditions in the Mental
Health Bill are not met.
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HL v United Kingdom21 
The case of HL has created further confusion about the interface between the two Bills. The
decision makes clear that a person who lacks capacity to consent to his/her admission to hospital
but who does not object, can nevertheless be ‘deprived of his liberty’ within the meaning of Article
5(1) ECHR. Moreover, the legal framework provided by the common law doctrine of ‘necessity’ and
‘best interests’ contains inadequate procedural safeguards to protect such patients. This could apply
to incapacitated informal patients in hospitals and people who lack capacity and are living in nursing
homes or care homes whose particular circumstances may amount to a deprivation of liberty. 
In future, such patients will need to be detained under a properly regulated system in order to
guarantee them the kind of safeguards that are lacking at common law. It was implicitly accepted
by the Court that the proper procedure need not be the full compulsory admission procedure of
the Mental Health Act 1983. The Law Society accepts that the Mental Capacity Bill could be
amended to provide the necessary Article 5(1) ECHR procedural safeguards to avoid arbitrary
detention. These safeguards should include clear conditions for detention, a formal assessment
process and the appointment of a representative for the patient.
However, if the Mental Capacity Bill were amended in this way, there would also be a need for further
amendment to include the review safeguards necessary under Article 5(4) ECHR. In principle the
Court of Protection provisions would provide sufficient safeguards. However, in practice it is
unlikely that the Government would wish to use a High Court procedure to deal with thousands of
routine decisions, many of which will be uncomplicated, uncontroversial and uncontested. The
regulatory impact assessment for the Mental Capacity Bill suggests that it was only anticipated that
the Court of Protection would deal with about 200 cases a year.22
The alternative option would be to substantially amend the Mental Health Act 1983 (and the
Mental Health Bill) and widen its ambit to cover all those who lack capacity and need treatment
for mental disorder in hospital. This would provide sufficient Article 5 safeguards, for example by
providing access to the Mental Health Review Tribunal, and would increase the numbers of
patients entitled to free section 117 aftercare services. However, this option would also have
substantial resource implications and does not address the needs of incapacitated people who are
not in hospital but are living in circumstances amounting to a deprivation of liberty. 
What is clear is that the Government needs to urgently address this issue because there will be
many people who are “HL” detained but who do not meet the criteria for the use of compulsory
powers under either the current Mental Health Act or the Draft Mental Health Bill.
Mental Health Tribunals
The Law Society believes that the proposals to create a new Tribunal system are elaborate and far-
reaching. However, there remain serious doubts as to whether it would safeguard patients’ rights.
The relevant conditions in the Bill are extremely wide. The Mental Health Tribunal is to have no
discretion to discharge if all the relevant conditions are met, and as the conditions are so widely
defined, it may be extremely difficult for a person to be discharged once he/she has been made
subject to the provisions of the Bill.23
21 Application no. 45580/09 5 October 2004
22 Para. 43
23 Clauses 45 and 56
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The Bill does not address the difficulty that will arise if the Mental Health Tribunal and the
approved clinician cannot agree on the care plan.24 If the Tribunal is to have a real role in
monitoring the treatment of patients, the care plans will need to be detailed and precise. The
opportunities for disagreement will be considerable, not only between any particular Tribunal and
the approved clinician, but also between one Tribunal and the next. It will be logistically
impossible to ensure continuity of tribunal membership as a patient’s care develops. It will
therefore be necessary for the approved clinician to re-argue the whole case before each Tribunal,
as the new Tribunal members will have to be satisfied on their own account that the treatment plan
is appropriate.
Furthermore, although the Bill will require a Mental Health Tribunal to make decisions about a
patient’s ongoing treatment and to authorise care plans, the Tribunal will not be in a position to
monitor or police its decisions. This may result in considerable amounts of litigation when the
arrangements go wrong and people suffer as a result of a Tribunal decision. Equally, there are likely
to be many appeals to the Mental Health Appeal Tribunal.25 The Law Society therefore has grave
concerns about whether the new expanded system is realistic and practicable.
The proposals are extremely resource intensive, both in terms of time and money. The Mental
Health Review Tribunal system is struggling to manage at present with many appeals being
cancelled and delayed.26 The Bill will lead to a significant increase in the numbers of hearings and
a vast expansion in the types of decisions that tribunals will have to consider, such as authorising
care plans, displacing nominated persons, authorising ECT and examining whether the relevant
conditions apply. This will require a major change in the culture of Tribunals.27 It is also likely that
hearings will be significantly longer, which will have massive resource implications for recruitment
and training. Each hearing may last at least 50% longer, due to the Tribunal’s extended remit to
include consideration and approval of the care and treatment plan, so there will be fewer hearings
carried out per panel, per day.
The Law Society believes that the Bill will only be workable if there is a dramatic increase in
resources. For example, the new Mental Health Tribunal system would require a significant
increase in the numbers of mental health professionals, approved clinicians, tribunal members and
expert panel members, together with proper administrative support. However it seems unlikely
that resources will be available in the foreseeable future given the current staff shortages in the
provision of mental health services.28
Article 5 (4) of the ECHR requires that a person deprived of their liberty shall have the lawfulness
of their detention decided speedily by a court. Court judgements have recognised that the current
Mental Health Review Tribunal system has been beset with resource and administration
difficulties that have led to delays and cancellations of hearings which have seriously prejudiced
24 For example, clauses 45 and 56 assume that the
Tribunal and clinical supervisor will agree 
25 For example, it is well established that the
‘reasonableness’ of an action taken by a person carrying
out a public function, such as an approved clinician or
a Mental Health Tribunal, is a point of law. 
26 The Institute of Mental Health Act Practitioners
(2004) has recently documented this in a survey of 11
Mental Health Trusts between May–August 2004.
27 The main function of the current MHRT is to review
justification for continued detention. This is far
narrower than the proposals in the Bill. 
28 See ‘National Service Framework for Mental health:
Five Years On’ (2004) MIND publications. 
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patient’s interests.29 We are concerned that the Bill will put additional stress on this system and
unless considerable resources are made available, patients will continue to be denied a speedy
review of their detention. 
It is clear from the Bill that the Tribunal is intended to play a pivotal role in safeguarding the
interests of detained patients. However, the Law Society believes that the proposed Tribunal
structure is unworkable. If we are correct, then the main safeguard for patients will fall away,
patients will be left in a vulnerable position and the exposure to human rights claims will be very
serious.
Conclusion
Mental health legislation is in need of reform but the Bill is not an improvement on the existing
law. The Law Scoiety’s view is that the Government should focus on amending aspects of the 1983
Act and, before introducing any major reform, should monitor the implementation of the Mental
Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, which is due to come into effect in October of
this year. 
29 For example, R v MHRT London South and South-West Region, ex p. C [2002] 1 WLR 176 and R v MHRT and
Secretary of State for Health, ex p. KB [2002] EWHC 639.
